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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to explore the claim of ageism made against the National Institute for 
Health & Clinical Excellence and like organisations, and to identify circumstances under which 
ageist discrimination might arise. We adopt a broad definition of ageism as representing any 
discrimination against individuals or groups of individuals solely on the basis that they have 
shorter life expectancy than others. A simple model of NICE’s decision making process is 
developed which demonstrates that NICE’s recommendations do not inherently discriminate on 
the basis of life expectancy per se but that scope for discrimination may arise in the case of 
specific technologies having identifiable characteristics. Such discrimination may favour patients 
with either longer or shorter life expectancy. It is shown that NICE’s policies, procedures and the 
context in which NICE makes its decisions not only reduce the scope for discriminatory 
recommendations but also – in the case of “end of life” treatments – increase the likelihood that 
NICE’s recommendations favour those with shorter, rather than longer, life expectancy.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In a recent series of articles and editorials, John Harris
1
 has accused the most prominent public 
agency espousing the practice of cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) in health care decision 
making, the UK’s National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), of “age 
discrimination” for embracing the use of quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) (Harris, 2005a; 
2005b)
2
. According to Harris, “in every case QALYs are indeed, and by definition, inherently 
ageist and also favour those with the greater life expectancy regardless of age” (Harris, 2005b). 
Harris’s argument has superficial attraction. Since older patients tend to have a shorter life 
expectancy than younger patients – and often a persistently worse state of health – the QALYs 
associated with their remaining life expectancy are generally lower too. A life-saving procedure 
therefore tends to yield a larger QALY benefit when carried out on a younger person than on an 
older person. Since NICE takes QALYs into account when assessing whether or not to 
recommend technologies (NICE, 2008), it seems to follow that NICE is inherently ageist in its 
decision making. 
This paper demonstrates that ageism in NICE’s decision making is neither inherent nor 
inevitable. It will be shown that, for a charge of ageism against any of NICE’s guidance to stick, 
a number of conditions must hold for the technology in question. NICE’s policies, procedures 
and the context in which it makes its recommendations all reduce the likelihood of such 
conditions being satisfied. We further show that, under some conditions, NICE will tend to 
discriminate not against the old but against the young. Moreover, NICE’s recent guidance on 
“end of life” treatments increases the possibility of this type of discrimination while reducing 
still further the scope for discrimination against the old. 
  
                                                          
1
 Harris has previously made a number of false statements about the use of QALYs in practice, which shall not 
detain us here. For example, the QALY is: [1] “supposedly a criterion of beneficial health care”, [2] “a measure of 
efficiency in health care’, and [3] “a method of settling priorities in health care” (Harris 1988, p. 77). Statement 1 is 
true so long as one remembers the singularity of the criterion – the QALY is but one of many possible indicators of 
beneficial care; statement 2 is false: more QALYs are an indicator neither of efficiency nor inefficiency (no one 
claims, of course, that they are an indicator of fairness); statement 3 is false: QALYs may be helpful in 
understanding in a quantitative way one element in a balancing of pros and cons when one is “settling” priorities. 
2
 See also Quigley (2007) and the responses of Claxton and Culyer (2006, 2007, 2008). 
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HOW WE DEFINE AGEISM 
The term “ageism” was coined by R. N. Butler as “… a process of systematic stereotyping of and 
discrimination against people because they are old” (Butler 1975, p.12). In our context, ageism 
has had two related meanings that tend to result in discriminatory decisions about health care 
resource allocation, each of which is rooted in a stylized, but broadly true, factual account. The 
first is that ‘old people’ may indeed be stereotyped in many of the ways vividly described by 
Butler as “myths” (pp. 7-11)
3
; the second is that, being old, their expectation of remaining life 
with or without a particular technology is generally lower than that of a younger person. 
However, as Harris (2005a) accepts, there are also young people with short expectations of 
remaining life. We therefore adopt a broad definition of ageism as representing any 
discrimination against individuals or groups of individuals solely on the basis that they have 
shorter life expectancy than others (irrespective of their age).  
 
POLICY CONTEXT 
Under this definition of ageism, the charge against NICE is that it discriminates in its guidance 
against individuals with shorter life expectancy, whether old or otherwise. To investigate this 
claim requires a thorough consideration of exactly how and under what basis NICE makes its 
recommendations. These are made by one of four Appraisal Committees, whose members are 
drawn from the NHS, patient and carer organisations, academia and the pharmaceutical and 
medical devices industries.
4
 NICE is charged by the Secretary of State with some specific duties, 
of which the first is “… to appraise the clinical benefits and the costs of such health care 
interventions… and to make recommendations” (NHS, 2005). NICE has interpreted “costs” as 
representing all costs associated with the intervention in question (whether direct or indirect) 
which are incurred by the NHS or Personal Social Services (NICE, 2008). It has interpreted 
“clinical benefits” as the expected gain in health by the recipients of care and has recommended 
the EQ-5D version of the QALY as its preferred quantitative indicator of this gain (NICE, 2008). 
                                                          
3
 This is to be distinguished from the fact that old people often have multiple morbidities and a general health state 
that makes them less responsive to health care. Less ability to benefit from health care for such reasons may indeed 
be a ground for not prioritising someone but it is not inherently ageist. 
4
 http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/howwework/devnicetech/technologyappraisalcommittee/technology_appraisal_ 
committee.jsp 
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NICE has from its inception acknowledged that QALY estimates do not exist for many 
interventions and that, even when they do exist, they need to be interpreted with care – both 
regarding the well-known assumptions on which they are calculated and in the specific context 
of the patients and circumstances being considered at the time. QALY estimates are checked 
against patient experience through the deliberative processes of the relevant Appraisals 
Committee and, where it is deemed necessary, supplemented by other measures of health benefit.  
NICE’s Appraisal Committee does not consider these QALY or cost estimates in isolation. 
Rather, it considers both the expected QALY benefit and the expected costs associated with the 
technology in question and any relevant comparator technologies and then calculates the 
expected ‘incremental’ QALY benefit and expected ‘incremental’ costs associated with each 
technology relative to the next less-effective or less-costly comparator technology (NICE, 2008). 
For example, if a particular technology provides each patient an expected benefit of 8 QALYs at 
an expected cost of £100,000, while the next less-effective comparator provides an expected 
benefit of 3 QALYs at an expected cost of £25,000, then the technology in question provides an 
expected incremental benefit of 5 QALYs at an expected incremental cost of £75,000. These 
expected incremental QALYs and costs are then rearranged into an ‘incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio’ (ICER) by dividing the expected incremental costs by the expected 
incremental QALYs – in this case the ICER of the technology will be £75,000 / 5 QALYs = 
£15,000 per QALY. An important (but by no means only) part of NICE’s decision making 
process is to compare this ICER to the adopted ‘cost-effectiveness threshold’, which in NICE’s 
case is £20,000-30,000 per QALY – technologies with ICERs below the cost-effectiveness 
threshold are likely to be accepted, while technologies with ICERs above the cost-effectiveness 
threshold are likely to be rejected
5
 (NICE, 2008). With an ICER of £15,000 per QALY, the 
example technology considered here is very likely to be accepted
6
. 
In practice, NICE will often consider subgroups of patients with different characteristics – for 
example patients of different age, sex, severity of disease, etc. If the QALYs and costs associated 
with the technology and its comparators differ between subgroups then the ICERs will tend to 
                                                          
5
 For the sake of simplicity, it will be assumed throughout this paper that the estimated incremental costs and 
QALYs are both positive (resulting in an ICER that is also positive). Our conclusions are unaffected by these 
assumptions. 
6
 Hereafter ‘QALYs’ and ‘costs’ refer to the estimated incremental QALY benefit and estimated incremental costs 
respectively. 
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differ between subgroups too. NICE then considers each of these different ICERs, and in some 
cases the technology will be recommended for one subgroup of patients but not for another. In 
assessing whether NICE discriminates on the basis of life expectancy, a crucial question to ask is 
therefore: to what extent does life expectancy affect the ICER associated with any particular 
technology? More specifically, do differences in life expectancy between subgroups of patients 
result in sufficient differences between the ICERs for discrimination to result? The aim of this 
paper is to establish in a rigorous way the circumstances under which such discrimination may 
occur. 
 
A FORMAL MODEL 
The NICE decision setting can be modelled formally with some simple algebra. Suppose that 
NICE must recommend whether to accept a particular technology or its comparator and is 
provided with QALY and cost data for two different subgroups of patients: subgroup  and 
subgroup . Following treatment with the technology, patients in subgroup  have a relatively 
short life expectancy of  years, while those in subgroup  have a longer life expectancy of  
years, where . The QALY benefits of treatment are denoted by  for subgroup  and 
 for subgroup , while the costs of treatment are  for subgroup  and  for subgroup . 
In each case  signals a difference of either outcome or cost between the technology and its 
comparator. For the moment assume no discounting. The ICERs for the technology are therefore 
 for subgroup  and  for subgroup . 
Suppose for now that NICE considers only the ICERs of the technology in question when 
deciding whether to recommend a technology for any particular subgroup of patients, and that it 
uses a common cost-effectiveness threshold across all subgroups. The cost-effectiveness 
threshold is denoted by . NICE will recommend the technology for those patients with longer 
life expectancy if  and will not recommend the treatment for patients with shorter 
life expectancy if . For NICE to discriminate in its guidance against patients with 
shorter life expectancy therefore requires an ICER for patients with longer life expectancy 
sufficiently lower than the ICER for patients with shorter life expectancy that the cost-
effectiveness threshold lies between the two: 
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 .       (1) 
This is shown graphically in Figure 1. The slopes of the two rays from the origin, Oa and Ob, 
represent the ICERs for the two subgroups, while the slope of the dotted line represents . The 
region between the two ICERs will hereafter be referred to as the “region of differential cost-
effectiveness”, or RDCE. Discrimination results only if  lies within the RDCE, as drawn. 
Where  lies above or below the RDCE then NICE will make the same recommendation for both 
subgroups, so no discrimination will occur.
7
 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Unfortunately, the characteristics of technologies more or less likely to satisfy condition (1) are 
not immediately obvious. The model will now be used to derive a more intuitive condition for 
decisions to be discriminatory. 
 
A MORE INTUITIVE CONDITION 
Our first step is to extend the model to incorporate time. In general, the QALYs and costs of each 
technology will not be incurred immediately or even during the first year following the start of 
treatment but will instead be incurred over a much longer time horizon, in principle over a 
patient’s lifetime
8
. It is therefore usual practice to disaggregate the QALYs and costs for each 
subgroup by the year in which they will be incurred
9
. Denoting the current year as 1, the QALYs 
and costs for each subgroup may be disaggregated as follows: 
      (2) 
                                                          
7
 The greater the difference between the ICERs (and hence the cost-effectiveness of the technology) for each 
subgroup, the larger the region of differential cost-effectiveness (RDCE). Where the technology is equally cost-
effective in each subgroup, the RDCE is undefined.  
8
 This is true even if the treatment itself is short: where the treatment is life-saving – or provides any lasting 
improvement in a patient’s health state, however small – QALY benefits may be realised long after the end of 
treatment. 
9
 This is particularly useful for discounting, which is considered later. 
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      (3) 
    (4) 
 ,   (5) 
where  and  represent the QALYs and costs of treatment for each subgroup, , in each 
year, . From (2-5), the ICERs for the treatment may be rewritten as:  
       (6) 
,      (7) 
for subgroups  and  respectively. Condition (1) may then be rewritten as: 
 .    (8) 
We now make an important assumption. In practice, subgroups of patients with different life 
expectancies tend to differ in other attributes as well – patients with shorter life expectancy tend 
to be older, are more likely to have co-morbidities and generally have worse overall health. Such 
patients may respond differently to treatment and may incur different costs, particularly if 
complications are more likely. This will inevitably lead to variations between subgroups in terms 
of the QALY benefits and costs of treatment in each year. However, in order to tease out whether 
NICE’s decision making discriminates on the basis of life expectancy per se we shall assume 
that all other attributes are equal – that is, patients in subgroup  are identical to those in 
subgroup  in every way other than in life expectancy
10
. Where this is the case, the QALYs and 
costs of treatment will be identical for both subgroups until year , when those patients in 
subgroup  die. The QALYs and costs will then generally differ between the subgroups from 
year  until year , when those patients in subgroup  die. After year  the QALYs and 
costs for both subgroups will be zero and need not be considered. Algebraically, , 
, … ,  and , … , . The ICER for 
subgroup  therefore represents a ‘common ratio’ of costs to QALYs for both subgroups up to 
year : 
                                                          
10
 We may weaken this assumption if the attributes in which the subgroups differ have no bearing on the QALYs 
and costs associated with treatment.  
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  .   (9) 
For ease of notation, we will refer to the ratio of costs to QALYs for subgroup  over years 
 to  as the ‘subsequent ratio’, since these costs and QALYs are incurred in the years 
subsequent to the death of subgroup . This subsequent ratio may be written algebraically as 
. While the ICER for subgroup  is determined solely by the common 
ratio, the ICER for subgroup  is determined by both the common ratio and the subsequent ratio. 
If these ratios are equal then both subgroups have the same ICER
11
. Any difference between the 
ICERs is therefore driven by the (generally larger) difference between the ratios. Importantly for 
our purposes, the ICER for subgroup  is lower than the ICER for subgroup  only if the 
subsequent ratio is lower than the common ratio.  
We can use this observation to derive a weaker but more intuitive condition from (8). A 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for NICE to discriminate on the basis of life expectancy 
is that the ICER for subgroup  be lower than that for subgroup : 
 .     (10) 
If both subgroups are identical, except with regard to life expectancy, this is equivalent to stating 
that a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for (8) to hold is that the subsequent ratio be lower 
than the common ratio: 
 .    (11) 
This has a clear prescription: a necessary condition for NICE to be discriminatory in its guidance 
against patients with shorter life expectancy is that the ratio of costs to QALYs for the 
technology in question be lower over the long term (following the death of patients with shorter 
life expectancy) than over the short term. Whether this holds depends on the intertemporal 
distribution of QALYs and costs for the technology. It is more likely to hold for technologies 
with largely upfront costs and long term QALY benefits (such as some preventive programmes 
or surgery) and less likely to hold for technologies with continuous long term costs and constant 
                                                          
11
 This can be determined from Figure 2 and is also a standard result from mathematics – if a ratio is the same over 
years  to  as over years  to  then it holds over years  to . 
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or declining QALY benefits (such as long-term care for diabetes or rheumatoid arthritis). In the 
case of the former, the upfront costs increase the common ratio while having no effect on the 
subsequent ratio, while in the latter case the flat or declining QALY benefits and continuous 
long-term costs result in a common ratio equal to or lower than the subsequent ratio. 
Critically, if condition (11) does not hold – and NICE considers only the ICERs when making its 
decisions – then there is no possibility of NICE discriminating against patients with shorter life 
expectancy: if it accepts the technology for those in subgroup  then it must accept the 
technology for those in subgroup . Even if (11) holds, discrimination is not inevitable. To 
satisfy condition (8), the ICER for subgroup  must lie above , and, furthermore, the subsequent 
ratio must be sufficiently small to pull the ICER for subgroup  below .  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
This is demonstrated in Figure 2. The slope of the ray Oa is the ICER for subgroup  (the 
common ratio), the slope of Ob is the ICER for subgroup  and the subsequent ratio is the slope 
of cd. As before, the region between the two ICERs represents the RDCE. The cost-effectiveness 
threshold, , is represented by the slope of Oe. Discrimination requires that Oe falls within the 
RDCE; for such discrimination to favour patients with shorter life expectancy requires that Oa 
lies above Oe and that ab be shallower than Oa to such an extent that Ob lies below Oe. If ab is 
not shallower than Oa then there is no scope for ageist discrimination. However, if ab is steeper 
than Oa then the RDCE will lie above the ICER for subgroup ; if, in addition, Oe lies within the 
RDCE then NICE will in fact discriminate against patients with longer life expectancy.  
  
FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
Discounting 
In common with other public sector institutions (HM Treasury, 2003), NICE requires that 
estimates of future QALYs and costs be discounted - currently at a compound rate of 3.5% per 
10 
 
annum - in order to account for time preference (NICE, 2008). So an estimated benefit of 10 
QALYs five years from now would be discounted to a present value of 8.42 QALYs, while an 
estimated cost of £1m ten years from now would be discounted to a present value of £708,919. 
Algebraically, the discounted ICERs are now:  
      (12) 
     (13) 
where  denotes the discount rate. NICE’s decisions therefore discriminate against those with 
shorter life expectancy where (from 8, 12 and 13): 
 .  (14) 
Since the discount rate is compounded over time, the long term costs and QALYs which 
comprise the subsequent ratio are discounted more heavily than those which comprise the 
common ratio. This has an ambiguous impact on the size of each ratio
12
 but will in all cases 
diminish the influence of the subsequent ratio on the ICER for subgroup . Technologies with 
largely up-front costs and long term benefits will therefore tend to have higher ICERs following 
discounting, while technologies with relatively flat long term costs and declining QALY benefits 
will tend to have lower ICERs
13
.  
This is shown in Figure 2. In view of the ambiguous impact of discounting upon the common 
and subsequent ratios, these ratios are assumed to remain unchanged. However, the rays 
representing the common and subsequent ratios become shorter under discounting, shifting from 
Oa to Od and from ab to cd respectively. Critically, because the costs and QALYs which 
comprise the subsequent ratio are discounted more heavily than those which comprise the 
common ratio, the ray representing the subsequent ratio is shortened proportionally more. As a 
result, the subsequent ratio is relatively less influential in determining the ICER for subgroup . 
This loss of influence pulls the ICER for subgroup  closer to that for subgroup , narrowing the 
                                                          
12
 Each ratio will rise or fall depending on the specific distribution of incremental costs and incremental QALYs 
within the ratio – where the costs tend to be incurred later than the QALYs the ratio will likely fall, and vice versa. 
13
 Brouwer et al. (2005) give some examples of the impact that discounting can have on the ICERs for treatments 
with long term costs or QALY benefits. 
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RDCE
14
. The higher the discount rate, the further the RDCE is narrowed, reducing the scope for 
Oe to lie within the RDCE.  
Discounting therefore reduces the scope for discrimination on the basis of life expectancy, with 
this scope diminishing with increases in the discount rate. Since the 3.5% discount rate used by 
NICE has been argued by many authors to be too high (Brouwer et al., 2005; Claxton et al., 
2006; Gravelle et al., 2007; Paulden & Claxton, 2009), a strong case can be made that NICE’s 
current discounting policy actively (if unintentionally) reduces the scope for discrimination.  
 
“End of life” treatments 
In January 2009, following the establishment of a National End of Life Care Programme by the 
Department of Health, recommendations from its Citizens Council (NICE Citizens Council, 
2009) and a public consultation, NICE issued supplementary guidance on evaluating treatments 
which satisfy all of the following criteria: (a) the treatment is indicated for patients with a short 
life expectancy, normally less than 24 months; (b) there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the 
treatment offers an extension to life, normally of at least an additional 3 months, compared to 
current NHS treatment; (c) no alternative treatment with comparable benefits is available through 
the NHS; and (d) the treatment is licensed, or otherwise indicated, for small patient populations 
(NICE, 2009a). Where a treatment satisfies these “end of life” criteria and the ICER for those 
patients with short life expectancy is above the cost-effectiveness threshold, the Appraisal 
Committee now considers “the magnitude of the additional weight that would need to be 
assigned to the QALY benefits in this patient group for the cost-effectiveness of the technology 
to fall within the current threshold range” (NICE, 2009a), in other words the weight which would 
need to be applied to the (discounted) QALYs of patients with short life expectancy for the ICER 
for such patients to fall below £30,000 per QALY. If the committee regards this weight as 
acceptable then the treatment may now be approved for those patients even though the ICER is 
above the cost-effectiveness threshold. For example, in NICE’s recent appraisal of Lenalidomide 
for the treatment of multiple myeloma, the committee identified the weight for the relevant 
                                                          
14
 This is also true in cases where the subsequent ratio is lower than the common ratio, raising the possibility of 
discrimination against those with longer life expectancy. In such cases, the undiscounted ICER for subgroup L 
(represented by Ob) would lie above that for subgroup S (Oa), but Oc would lie below Ob (rather than above, as 
drawn in Figure 2). Discounting would still narrow the gap between the ICERs, reducing the scope for 
discrimination. 
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subgroup of patients as being approximately 1.4 (corresponding to an ICER of £43,800 per 
QALY) and deemed such a weight to be acceptable (Wishart, 2009). Lenalidomide was 
subsequently approved for those patients despite the ICER lying well above NICE’s cost-
effectiveness threshold (NICE, 2009b). 
This new guidance can be incorporated into our model. Suppose that, following treatment, the 
life expectancy of those patients in subgroup  is less than 2 years, while the life expectancy of 
those in subgroup  is greater than 2 years ( ). For treatments which satisfy the “end of 
life” criteria, NICE would now apply a weight to the QALYs for patients in subgroup  but not 
to those for patients in subgroup . It would therefore discriminate against patients with shorter 
life expectancy if (from 14): 
   (15) 
where  denotes the highest acceptable weight that NICE is willing to assign to the QALYs of 
those with shorter life expectancy.  
Equivalently (and perhaps more intuitively), NICE could instead be viewed as adopting a higher 
cost-effectiveness threshold for patients with shorter life expectancy, , rather than placing a 
greater weight on their QALYs. In this case NICE would discriminate against patients with 
shorter life expectancy if (from 15): 
  (16) 
where  =  and .  
In Figure 2 this higher cost-effectiveness threshold, , is represented by Of. For “end of life” 
treatments, where the subsequent ratio is lower than the common ratio (as in Figure 2), 
discrimination against those in subgroup  now requires that both Oe and Of (rather than only 
Oe) lie within the RDCE, narrowing the scope for ageist discrimination. Furthermore, if Oe lies 
below the RDCE and Of lies above the RDCE then NICE will now discriminate against patients 
with longer life expectancy, where previously it would not. Alternatively, where the subsequent 
ratio is higher than the common ratio (and so the RDCE lies above the ICER for subgroup  and 
13 
 
below the ICER for subgroup , unlike in Figure 2), NICE’s supplementary guidance widens the 
scope for discrimination against those with longer life expectancy – such discrimination now 
occurs not only if Oe lies within the RDCE but also if Oe lies below the RDCE and Of lies 
within the RDCE. 
 
Other considerations of the Appraisal Committee  
Although useful for our modelling, the assumption that NICE only considers ICERs when 
making decisions is grossly over-simplistic. NICE has repeatedly stated that such evidence is 
used to aid and not replace the judgement of the Appraisal Committee, and NICE is acutely 
aware both that QALYs may not be plausible in specific contexts and that the models used to 
calculate the ICERs often incorporate uncertain data and occasionally dubious assumptions. 
NICE regards its decision making as a deliberative process and makes considerable use of patient 
and other stakeholder representation. As such, NICE is less likely to discriminate between 
subgroups on the basis of small differences between ICERs than would be implied by a strict 
interpretation of the conditions above. This further reduces the scope for ageist discrimination. 
 
DISCUSSION 
We have sought to investigate a particular argument made against NICE: that its use of the 
QALY is “ageist” by discriminating against those with shorter life expectancy. Using a simple 
model of NICE’s decision making setting, we have shown that ageist discrimination is neither 
inherent nor inevitable and requires the following conditions to hold for the technology in 
question: (a) the ratio of costs to QALYs must be lower over the long term than over the short 
term; (b) the ICER for patients with shorter life expectancy must lie above the cost-effectiveness 
threshold; and (c) the ICER for patients with longer life expectancy must fall below the cost-
effectiveness threshold
15
. These conditions must hold after taking into account discounting and – 
where applicable – NICE’s recent policy on appraising “end of life” treatments, both of which 
reduce the scope for ageist discrimination. Even where technologies satisfy these conditions, the 
Appraisal Committee has the authority to exercise discretion and to consider any possibility of 
                                                          
15
 While condition (a) is implied by (b) and (c), it deserves to be noted separately for its intuition. 
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ageism bias. It should also be noted that, where technologies fail to satisfy any of conditions (a) 
to (c), NICE’s guidance may in fact discriminate against patients with longer life expectancy. As 
such, Harris’s claim that NICE is ageist seems very difficult to substantiate. A fairer assessment 
of NICE would be that – except in the case of “end of life” treatments – it does not 
systematically discriminate on the basis of life expectancy. In the case of “end of life” 
treatments, NICE’s recent supplementary guidance quite intentionally (and paradoxically) 
increases the scope for discrimination against patients with longer life expectancy by weighting 
the QALYs of patients with shorter life expectancy higher.  
Harris states that “in every case QALYs are indeed, and by definition, inherently ageist and also 
favour those with the greater life expectancy regardless of age”. While this would generally be 
true if the only QALYs considered were the remaining QALYs in each patient’s life, this is not a 
basis on which NICE and similar organisations make recommendations. NICE instead considers 
the incremental QALY benefit resulting from treatment – where a technology results in a greater 
improvement in health-related quality of life for more seriously ill patients, or results in a greater 
extension to life in patients closer to death, the QALY benefit of the technology may in fact be 
greater for those patients who have fewer remaining QALYs. Furthermore, when making 
recommendations NICE also considers the costs of treatment and not just the QALY benefit. 
While saving the life of a patient with long life expectancy tends to yield a larger QALY benefit, 
the long term costs associated with any such treatment will generally also be greater. Indeed, the 
ICER associated with treating that patient may then be as high (or higher) than that for treating a 
patient with shorter life expectancy. It is these ICERs – not the incremental QALY benefits 
alone, and certainly not the remaining QALYs in a patient’s life – that form an important (but not 
the only) consideration in NICE’s decision making process. 
In short, it does not logically follow that NICE is ageist simply because it considers QALYs as 
part of its decision making. Ageism in NICE’s decision making is neither inherent nor inevitable. 
NICE’s only policy which actively addresses discrimination on the basis of life expectancy is its 
recent supplementary guidance on “end of life” treatments. This policy arose as a direct 
consequence of the context in which NICE operates – in response to explicit political imperatives 
from Parliament and following consultations with the public – and raises the scope for 
discrimination against those with longer, not shorter, life expectancy. 
15 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis has important implications for bodies such as NICE who adopt a time-dependant 
measure of health (such as the QALY) in their decision making. The first is that the kind of 
ageism which can arise through the application of cost-effectiveness methods is discrimination 
against individuals or groups of individuals on the basis that they have shorter life expectancy 
than others, irrespective of their age. Ageism may thus arise in the case of young people and 
mere age is an unreliable indicator of the circumstances under which it may exist.  
However, the main implication of our analysis is that such discrimination is neither inevitable 
nor inherent. It can only arise when the technology under consideration satisfies the following 
conditions: 
a) The ICER for a subgroup of patients with relatively short life expectancy lies above 
the cost-effectiveness threshold; and 
b) The ICER for a subgroup of patients with longer life expectancy falls below the cost-
effectiveness threshold. 
For these conditions to hold requires that the long term ratio of costs to QALYs associated with 
the technology be lower than the short term ratio of costs to QALYs. Such technologies are 
likely to display specific identifiable characteristics, such as high upfront costs and/or continuous 
long term health benefits. Where such characteristics are identified, a consideration of the 
possibility of ageism ought to inform the deliberations of the advisory committee(s) responsible 
for drafting guidance.  
16 
 
REFERENCES 
Butler, R. N. 1975. Why Survive? Being Old in America. Harper & Row, New York. 
Brouwer, W. B. F., Niessen, L.W., Postma, M. J., Rutten, F. F. H. 2005. Need for differential 
discounting of costs and health effects in cost effectiveness analyses. British Medical Journal 
331, 446-448. 
Claxton, K., Culyer, A. J. 2006.Wickedness or folly? The ethics of NICE’s decisions. Journal of 
Medical Ethics 37, 373-378. 
Claxton, K., Culyer, A. J. 2007. Rights, responsibilities and NICE: A Rejoinder to Harris. 
Journal of Medical Ethics 33, 462-464. 
Claxton, K., Culyer, A. J. 2008. Not a NICE fallacy: A reply to Dr Quigley. Journal of Medical 
Ethics 34, 598-601. 
Claxton, K., Paulden, M., Gravelle, H., Brouwer, W. B. F., Culyer, A. J. 2010. Discounting and 
decision making in the economic evaluation of health care technologies. Health Economics, 
forthcoming. 
Claxton, K., Sculpher, M., Culyer, A. J., McCabe, C., Briggs, A., Akehurst, R., Buxton, M., 
Brazier, J. 2006. Discounting and cost-effectiveness in NICE - stepping back to sort out a 
confusion. Health Economics 15, 1-4. 
Gravelle, H., Brouwer, W. B. F., Niessen, L. W., Postma, M. J., Rutten, F. F. H. 2007. 
Discounting in economic evaluations: stepping forward towards optimal decision rules. Health 
Economics 16, 307-317.  
Harris, J. 1988. More and better justice. in Bell, J. M., Mendus, S. (editors) Philosophy and 
Medical Welfare. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 75-96. 
Harris J. 2005a. It’s not NICE to discriminate. Journal of Medical Ethics 31, 373. 
Harris, J. 2005b. Nice and not so nice. Journal of Medical Ethics 31, 685. 
17 
 
Harris J. 2006. NICE is not cost effective. Journal of Medical Ethics 32, 378-380. 
NHS. 2005. Directions and Consolidating Directions to the National Institute for Health and 
Clinical Excellence. Downloaded on 12/11/09 at 
http://www.nice.org.uk/aboutnice/whatwedo/niceandthenhs/directions_from_the_secretary_of_st
ate.jsp. 
HM Treasury. 2003. Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. HM Treasury, London.  
NICE. 2008. Guide to the Methods of Technology Appraisal. NICE: London. 
NICE. 2009. Appraising life-extending, end of life treatments. NICE: London. 
http://www.nice.org.uk/media/88A/F2/SupplementaryAdviceTACEoL.pdf. NICE: London. 
NICE. 2009. Lenalidomide for the treatment of multiple myeloma in people who have received 
at least one prior therapy. Technology appraisals TA171. 
http://www.nice.org.uk/nicemedia/pdf/TA171Guidance.pdf 
 
NICE Citizens Council. 2009. Departing from the Threshold, London: NICE. 
Paulden M, Claxton K. 2009. Budget allocation and the revealed social rate of time preference 
for health. CHE Research Paper 53. Centre for Health Economics: University of York. 
Quigley, M. 2007. A NICE fallacy. Journal of Medical Ethics 33,465-466. 
Wishart, A. 2009. Price of Life. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00l9dmw. BBC: London. 
  
18 
 
FIGURES 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
ICER for 
subgroup L 
ICER for 
subgroup S 
Cost-effectiveness 
threshold  
Figure 1 
a 
b 
RDCE 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
ICER for 
subgroup L 
(no discounting) 
 
ICER for 
subgroup S 
(common ratio)* 
ICER for 
subgroup L 
(with discounting) 
Cost-effectiveness 
threshold  
Cost-effectiveness 
threshold for 
“end of life” 
treatments  
Subsequent ratio  
(no discounting) Subsequent ratio 
(with discounting) 
Figure 2 
*With discounting the common ratio is represented by the dotted line only; 
without discounting the common ratio is extended by the bold line. 
**With discounting the RDCE is represented by the left shaded region only; 
without discounting the RDCE is represented by both shaded regions.  
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